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ABSTRACT
Multicast Open Shortest Path First (MOSPF) is an en
hancement to unicast routing protocol OSPF. It has been
widely used in many multicast applications for years. How
ever, its security is still a major concern in some applica
tions. Much work has been done on data protection, but
only a few works have been done on member access con
trol mechanisms. In this paper, we present a new secure
multicast architecture and protocol for MOSPF from the
perspective of member access control. Our new model in
cludes a variant of previous access control mechanism and
a novel distributed encryption scheme. This architecture in
particular meets the access control security needs o f dense
multicast routing protocol in MOSPF, simplifies the access
control process, and increases scalability and flexibility in
revocation and reauthorization.

fidentiality. The main method used to protect the data
is group key encryption, in which the multicast traffic is
encrypted with a symmetric key and all authorized group
members are given the decryption key. Many schemes
were proposed to provide the efficient re-keying for the
group key management protocol [6, 7]. These methods can
become very complicated because the membership is dy
namic. In addition, as mentioned in [4], there are some
other related issues where encryption o f communications
may not be possible for legal reasons; furthermore, even
where data confidentiality is provided, it may be possible
to do traffic analysis depending on the layer where encryp
tion is done.
Because o f the above reasons, research was done to
develop group access control schemes as an additional se
curity mechanism [5, 8, 9]. In this paper, we propose a new
secure multicast scheme and protocol for MOSPF based on
a broadcasting encryption scheme.
The rest o f this paper is organized as follows. Sec
tion 2 introduces the security architecture for multicast and
the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and re
views the proposed member access control schemes. Sec
tion 3 describes the MOSPF protocol architecture. Section
4 gives the novel distributed encryption scheme that is used
in the scheme. Section 5 presents our new secure multicast
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. Finally, in section 6,
we give some concluding remarks.
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1

Introduction

Multicasting provides an efficient communication mecha
nism in both private networks and Internet for large-scale
content distribution, such as audio and video conferences,
web casting, interactive game and video on demand. There
are three basic types of multicast routing protocols: dis
tance vector, link state and shared trees [1]. MOSPF be
longs to the category of link state [2, 3], MOSPF is also
called dense-mode multicast routing protocol, because it
requires some form o f flooding o f datagrams to the net
work to find multicast routes. This protocol is suitable for
areas with dense concentrations o f group members.

2

Security Architecture for Multicasting

This section briefly reviews security architecture, Internet
Group Management protocol and related proposed work
[1 0 ,1 1 ,5 , 9],
The multicast security (MSEC) working group of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) presents a multi
cast security architecture reference framework (Figure 1).
This Reference Framework is used to classify functional
areas, functional elements, and interfaces. In Figure 1, the
boxes are the functional entities and the arrows are the in
terfaces between them.

MOSPF is widely used in multicast but the security
issues are still a concern where confidential and high value
content are being transferred. Based on the properties of
the multicast, the components that should be secured in
clu d e^, 5]: multicast distribution tree protection, end-toend data protection through cryptographic operations and
member access control. The end-to-end data protection in
cludes data integrity, source authentication and data con
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There are three sets o f functional entities and three
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functional areas. The three sets o f functional entities are the
Policy Server, Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS),
Sender and Receiver.
The three functional areas are Multicast data han
dling, Group key Management, and the Multicast security
policies. Multicast data handling covers problems concern
ing the security-related treatments of multicast data by the
sender and the receiver. Typically, the data needs to be en
crypted by group key and authenticated in a secure multi
cast group. Group Key Management is concerned with the
secure distribution and refreshment o f keying material. The
keying material refers to the cryptographic key belonging
to a group, the state associated with the keys and the other
security parameters related to the keys. The multicast secu
rity policies cover aspects of policy in the context o f mul
ticast security and must provide the rules for operation for
the other elements of the Reference Framework. Our new
secure multicast architecture and protocol for MOSPF will
follow this reference framework.

other hand, the traditional methods used to cryptographically encrypt information cannot solve these problems. To
solve these security problems, we need to control the ability
o f hosts to join the multicast group. There are three func
tions required for multicast receiver access control. It in
cludes group policy specification functions, access request
functions and access control functions [4, 9], The proposed
solutions can be found in [5, 9, 12], Depending upon the
type o f revocation provided, these multicast receiver autho
rization solutions are classified into three types: central
ized, ACL supported and time-limited.
In [5], Hardjono and Cain present an approach that
makes use of the existing Group Key management protocol
for host members o f a group to deliver the IGMP keying
material to the host and the multicast distribution tree to de
liver the necessary keying material to the multicast routers.
The receiver host sends a join request including the access
token to the router, and the router verifies the access token
in the token list. In [12], Ballardie and Crowcroft present a
version of IGMP that allows receivers to be authorized be
fore joining the group. The architecture includes the group
owner (the initiator), the authorization server, the routers
and the receiver hosts. The group owner (the initiator) dis
tributes the ACLs to the authorization servers. The receiver
host sends a request to an authorization server to obtain
an authorization stamp. When the receive host joins this
group, it sends a join request to the router with this au
thorization stamp. Then the router forwards the receiver
host’s request to the authorization server for approval. In
[9], Judge and Ammar proposed a comprehensive architec
ture GOTHIC for providing group access control.

F U N C T IO N N A L
AREAS

M ulticast
S e c u rity
P o licies

G ro u p
K ey
M anagem ent

M ulticast
Data
H a n d lin g

Figure 1.
Framework

2.1

Multicast Security Architecture Reference

IGM P Protocol

2.2.1

The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is the
protocol through which hosts exchange information with
their local routers. This protocol is specified in [11], It is
used by IPv4 systems (hosts and routers) to report their IP
multicast group memberships to any neighboring multicast
routers. IGMP lets a router keep track of IP membership
on its local LANS by 2 types IGMP messages: sending
IGMP host membership queries and receiving IGMP host
membership reports.
We note that the multicast provides an open group
model. This open model has many beneficial aspects, but
it also causes security issues, as it cannot control member
ship to a set o f authorized hosts. Security problems include
eavesdropping, theft o f service, denial of service and pos
sibly cryptanalysis. The next section will discuss possible
solutions to addressing these issues.

2.2

Gothic Architecture

Figure 2. Gothic Architecture
In this section, we briefly describe the Gothic ar
chitecture proposed in [9]. Our new scheme extends the
Gothic architecture and provides a novel group key man
agement scheme that enables the management o f multi
cast groups to be efficient. The Gothic includes two sys
tems: the group policy management system and the group

M ember Access Control Schemes

As mentioned before, the open group model properties of
the multicast may cause serious security problems. On the
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member authorization system (Figure 2). The group policy
management system performs group policy specification
functions. It includes three components: the group owner,
the group owner determination and authentication system
(GODAS), and the access control server (ACS). The group
owner provides the security policy for the group and the list
of the authorized members to the ACS. The group owner
determination and authentication system (GODAS) pro
vide the system to verify that the host is the group owner.
The group member authorization system carries out access
request functions and access control functions. This system
involves the interaction among the host, the router and the
ACS.
This system works as follows. First, the group owner
contacts the ACS, and the ACS performs the authentica
tion and authorization. Then the group owner provides the
group policy to the ACS. Next, the receiver hosts request
a capability from the ACS. These capabilities are identity
based and time limited. After this, the receiver host can
send a join request along with the capabilities that it re
ceived from its ACS to the router. The router host authenti
cates the receiver host and verifies the capabilities. Finally,
the receiver host is allowed to join the group.

3

both the datagram’s source network and destination multi
cast group. Group membership LSAs are flooded through
out the OSPF routing domain so MOSPF routers can com
pute outgoing interface lists. The MOSPF routers use the
Dijkstra algorithm to compute shortest path tree for each
group.
Each MOSPF router in the distribution tree for each
source/destination combination bases its forwarding deci
sion on forwarding cache. A forwarding cache entry is built
from local group database and datagram’s shortest path
tree. The local group database records the group member
ship o f the router’s directly attached networks. This local
group database is built from the Internet Group Manage
ment Protocol (IGMP). In multi-access network, one router
is selected as Designated Router (DR); this Designated
Router originates a network links advertisement on behalf
o f the network and becomes adjacent to all other routers on
the network. The router updates the local group database
when the membership state is changed. The datagram’s
shortest path tree depicts the intermediate hops taken by a
multicast datagram when it is sent from the source to the in
dividual group members. This shortest path tree is built on
demand. It is built by using the router-LSAs and network LSAs in the link states database and having the source net
work as root. The branches that do not include the router
and transit networks are pruned from the tree.
For our new secure multicasting protocol, we need to
add the encryption key into the LSA control messages, so
that all the routers can store the encryption key to verify the
prospective members.

MOSPF (Multicast Open Short Path First)
Architecture

In this section, we will briefly introduce the MOSPF ar
chitecture [3]. Figure 3 shows a sample a MOSPF config
uration (Nx-the network, RTx- the router, M-the member,
H-the host, number is the cost from the routers to network).

4

Key Generation Algorithm

Our approach involves the proposal o f a dynamic group key
management scheme that enables secure and efficient up
dating o f group members. We achieve this by constructing
a public key that is associated with several associated pri
vate keys. Our proposal for secure multicasting is based on
our earlier work on key distribution described in [13].

4.1

Preliminaries

The security o f our scheme is based on the difficulty of
computing discrete logarithms, and the protocols are based
on the polynomial functions and a set of exponentials.
Let N be a composite o f two large primes,p, q,Z*N be
a multiplicative group of order 4>(N) = (p — l)(q - 1),
and g € Z$(n) be a generator, Let Xi
Z 9 for i =
0 ,1 ,2 , ...,n be a set of integers. A polynomial function

Figure 3. MOSPF Architecture
MOSPF is an extension to OSPF unicast routing pro
tocol. OSPF routers use link state advertisements (LSAs)
to understand all available links in the network and route
datagram along least cost paths. MOSPF includes multicast
information in OSPF link state advertisements (LSAs) to
construct multicast distribution trees. All MOSPF routers
maintain an up-to-date image of the topology o f the entire
network. The path of the multicast datagram depends on

of order n is constructed as follows: f ( x ) = n iL ifa ~
Xi) = E j= o ai x% m°d ‘K A ’), where the a* are coefficients:
a0 = rT)'=l(—x j)> a l = E i= l
)>•••> a n - 2 =
E iW C - Z iX - Z f) , «n—1 = E " = l ( - Xl)> “ n = 1- Note
that f ( x j ) =
a ix j ~
We can use this property to
construct a broadcasting encryption system. Note that we

EIU
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require <j>(N) to be a composite o f a large set of primes in
order to generate keys.
Having the set {a;}, we can then construct the corre
sponding exponential functions,

4.2

• Compute the ciphertext c = E k { M ) and k! —
k A sr mod A , where Ek(-) denotes a symmetric key
encryption function.
• Broadcast the 4-tuple (g , g , c, fc') to all subscribers.

{ g a\ g a\ g a\ - , g a n } = { go, g i , 9 2 , - , g n }-

To decrypt the session key, the user j computes
fcijjXjgXj _ j, moci tv. k is then used for the decryption

System Setup

o f the message.

5

The construction o f the encryption and decryption keys is
done as follows:
• Select n distinct random numbers Xj e
for i =
1,2, • • •, n, which form a set X n and a subset X m C

In this section, we will present our new secure multicast
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. As we discussed be
fore, traditional methods are still prone to threats such as
eavesdropping, theft o f service, or denial of service. The
proposed solutions are inadequate for large dynamic multi
cast group memberships. Our new secure multicast scheme
for MOSPF is partly based on the Gothic architecture men
tioned earlier; it includes two systems namely the group
key and policy management system and the group member
authorization systems (Figure 4).

X n.
• C o m p u ted = n ; = i ( n r o ^ ) m°diV . Note that
A is computed once only. We will see later, a dy
namic further updates of the system do not require re
computation of A.
• Select an integer b e Z^(jv) and compute its multi
plicative inverse 6_1 such that bb~l = 1 mod^(7Vr).
• Compute Xj = b~ 1
1 .2
n.

x ? ntod^(7V), for j

A New Secure M ulticast Architecture for
MOSPF

=
Area 1

• Compute Xj = s^x", where
Sj

= s\s'2

SjSj

= s ' mod<j)(N), sj t s'- 6 Z 0(JV).

We note that this construction requires </>(N) to be a com
posite o f many primes; therefore,
must be properly
chosen to suit this construction.
These values satisfy the equality:
A S g SbS j g S i ,

=

1

m 0 d N t

Vj- 6 {1J2,

A is kept by the authorized server and will be used as
the encryption key. Since the encryption key is not pub
lic, there is no need for us to protect it against any illegal
modification.
Xj and Xj are given to user j as its secret decryption
key during the process o f its registration. Hence the private
decryption key doublet is (X j , X j ) . Please note that compu
tation o f A is a one-time task. The server does not need to
modify it during a system update.

4.3

Figure 4. Secure Multicast Architecture for MOSPF

5.1

Group Key and Policy M anagement Sys
tem

Except for the group policy specification functions men
tioned before in the Gothic system, the group key and pol
icy management system also performs the access control
key generation and group session key generation functions.
The group key and policy management system involves
three parts: the group owner (for example, Host3 in Figure
4), the access control server (ACS) and the group owner
determination and authentication systems (GODAS). The
group owner generates group access control keys, group
keys for the group. It also provides the list o f authorized
members and other security policy for the group to ACS.
The multicast security policy can be referred to [14], The
access control server (ACS) is used to verify and authorize
the prospective member, and it also involves in the group

M ulticasting Encryption Protocol

The encryption key A is used to encrypt a session key that is
then used to encrypt a message. All members in the group
can decrypt the session key and then decrypt the message
individually with their private keys. Let us suppose that M
is the message to be encrypted and k is a session key.
The protocol is as follows:
• Select an integer r 6 r
• Compute g = g sr mod N and g = g sbr mod N .
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member authorization system. The group owner determi
nation and authentication systems (GODAS) can be used to
verify that the host is the group owner [9],
The first solution makes use o f group certificates (Fig
ure 5). This is similar to traditional digital certificates.

tween the host and the router. This system also assumes
the presences o f the public key infrastructure (PKI).
• {K +h , K _ h ) denotes the prospective member hosts
public key and private key pair
• ( K +acs, K —acs) denotes ACS public key and private
key pair.
• (K +x, C E R T k +!L) denotes the trusted authority key
and signed certificate
Authentication
Authorization

1 Authorization
REQ

(A, SnrJ
2 Authorization
ACK

Figure 5. Group Owner Certificates

©

The second solution is the use o f a group ownership
service (Figure 6). This service is a query/reply protocol
based service. It works in 4 different multicast environ
ments. It includes the multicast address allocation architec
ture (MAAA), the source specific multicast (SSM), GLOP,
and Session Announcement Protocol (SAP) / Session De
scription Protocol (SDP).

3 Join REQ
4 Join ACK
Authentication

Figure 7. Basic Authorization protocol
The interaction between the prospective member and
the ACS includes the following:
1. H -> A C S : A R = [G I D , C E R T K+h}K _h
2. A C S —> H : A A = C A P = [[I P H , D N H , G I D ,
T e x p i X j , C E R T K+acB\K _acB]K+h
Here
• A R denotes authorization request
• C A P denotes Capability
• G I D denotes the group ID
• A A denotes authorization acknowledgement

Figure 6. Group Ownership Service

5.2

• D N denotes the host’s distinguished name
• X j denotes the member decryption key p a ir [ ij, x j ]

Group Member Authorization System

The interaction between the prospective member and
the Router includes:

Group member authorization system is the main part of
controlling access to the group. This system performs
the access request and access control functions. It al
lows a prospective group member authorized to become a
group member. This system involves three components:
a prospective member host, a router and the access con
trol server (ACS). We assume that the presence of a public
key infrastructure, otherwise we can use the digitally sign
messages method [9]. The group owner generates the dis
tributed encryption key pairs (A, s) and decryption keys (x
and x), as discussed in the last section. We also assume
that there is one access control server (ACS) for the con
venience o f describing this protocol. The access control
authorization protocol is described as follows.

5.3

3. H

R : JR = CAP

4. R — H : J A = S ta t u s
Here
• J R denotes join request
• J A denotes join acknowledgement
First, the prospective member sends an authorization
request to the access control server (ACS). This authoriza
tion request (AR) includes the group ID that the member
want to join and his/her public key certificate, which is
signed by his/her private key.
Second, the access control server authenticates the
prospective member and decides if this prospective mem
ber can be authorized by checking the group policy from
the policy server. Then the access control server returns
an authorization acknowledgement (AA). If the request is

Authorization Protocol

The group m ember authorization system includes the inter
action between the host and ACS, and the interaction be
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6

successful, the prospective member will receive the decryp
tion key (x and x ), which is encrypted with the prospective
member’s public key.

In this paper, we have presented a new secure multicast
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. Our new scheme
involves a novel distributed encryption scheme and sim
plifies the access control process. The proposed scheme
has good scalability properties and achieves efficient
revocation and reauthorization. Currently, we are in the
process o f conducting a simulation of our proposed scheme
to analyse the performance issues.

Third, the access control server updates the encryp
tion key (A, S ) to (A , S new). As we discussed before, we
only need to change the S in this case. This can then be
transferred to one of the MOSPF router as part of the link
state advertisement (LSA) information. Based on the MO
SPF routing protocol, all the routers of the area will store
this information. We assume that the routing control mes
sages are secure, which can use the OSPF digital signature
[15].
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Reauthorization and Revocation

The group member needs to refresh their membership state
to coincide with the soft state of the IGMP group member
ship reports and of the routing protocol. In this scheme,
the router can encrypt the control messages and only the
qualified members have the decryption key in the group.
The group owner can cancel the member who has left by
changing the encryption key. On the other hand, the mem
ber who has left can also rejoin the group; the group owner
only need to change the encryption key. We can see that
this new scheme can achieve efficient revocation and reau
thorization.
This new secure multicast architecture and protocol
for MOSPF has the following advantages comparing to
the previous proposals [5, 9, 12]. First, this scheme sim
plifies access control protocol process by adding a group
control encryption key into the MOSPF LSA control mes
sages. This is because the access control server does not
need to transfer the prospective member’s certificates to re
lated routers every time. Next, the scheme is flexible and
the group owner can revoke a member at any time; other
proposed schemes can not do this, whether they use a capa
bility like token or a time limited token. Furthermore, our
scheme is scalable, when the group is dynamic with mem
bers joining and leaving frequently. This is a major advan
tage of our scheme over the previously proposed ones.
In this scheme, we assume that the router is trusted
and can receive group messages. One can easily envisage a
slight variation of the scheme which uses a hybrid method
by employing group session key and the group key man
agement protocols to enhance the system and to achieve
higher levels o f security.
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